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Abstract
This article describes and analyzes an emerging problem-
atic in the asylum and immigration debate, which I cyni-
cally dub the “imposter-child” phenomenon. My prelimi-
nary exploration maps how the imposter-child relates to 
and potentially influences the politics and practices of refu-
gee status determination in the United Kingdom. I argue 
that the “imposter-child” is being discursively constructed 
in order to justify popular and official suspicion of spon-
taneously arriving child asylum-seekers in favour of reset-
tling refugees from camps abroad. I also draw connections 
between the discursive creation of “imposter-children” and 
the diminishment of welfare safeguarding for young people. 
Further complicating this situation is a variety of sociocul-
tural factors in both Afghanistan and the United Kingdom, 
including the adversarial UK refugee status determination 
process, uncertainty around how the United Kingdom can 
“prove” an age, and a form of “triple discrimination” expe-
rienced by Afghan male youth. Through unearthing why 
the “imposter-child” is problematic, I also query why it is 
normatively accepted that non-citizens no longer deserve 
protection from the harshest enforcement once they “age 
out” of minor status.
Résumé
Cet article décrit et analyse une problématique émergente 
dans le débat sur l’asile et l’immigration, que je dénomme 
d’une façon cynique le phénomène des « enfants-impos-
teurs ». Mes explorations préliminaires démarquent 
comment « l’enfant-imposteur » est relié aux politiques 
et pratiques de détermination du statut de réfugié au 
Royaume-Uni, et comment il les influence potentiellement. 
Je soutiens que l’enfant-imposteur est constitué comme 
discours afin de justifier la méfiance populiste ainsi qu’offi-
cielle à l’égard des chercheurs d’asiles qui sont issus des 
arrivées spontanées, pour favoriser plutôt la réinstallation 
de réfugiés arrivant de camps à l’étranger. Je trace égale-
ment des liens entre la création discursive de ces « enfants-
imposteurs » et la réduction des aides sociales publiques 
pour les jeunes personnes. Cette situation est rendue 
encore plus compliquée par divers facteurs socioculturels 
en Afghanistan ainsi qu’au Royaume-Uni, dont notam-
ment le processus antagoniste de détermination du statut 
de réfugié au Royaume-Uni (DSR), l’incertitude autour de 
la « preuve » d’âge dans le pays, et une forme de « triple 
discrimination » subie par les jeunes Afghans de sexe 
masculin. En faisant ressortir les raisons pour lesquelles 
l’enfant-imposteur est problématique, j’interroge égale-
ment pourquoi il est normativement acceptable que les 
non-citoyens ne méritent plus d’être protégés des activités 
coercitives et d’exécution de règlements les plus sévères une 
fois qu’ils ont dépassé « l’âge limite » de statut de mineur.
Introduction1 
In the United Kingdom, refugee status determination (RSD) is a declaratory process performed usually in an administrative tribunal to adjudicate whether sponta-
neously arriving asylum-seekers should be granted asylum 
and its accompanying protection against removal.2 RSD is 
founded on a definition of the refugee elaborated in the 
1951  Convention  relating to the Status of  Refugees  and 
its 1967 Protocol (the Refugee Convention). Along with 
some other vulnerable groups identified during screening, 
unaccompanied or separated asylum-seeking children3 are 
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granted access to preferential treatment over adults while 
navigating the UK RSD process. This access includes entitle-
ments to housing and legal aid, and a staying of detention 
and deportation orders until the claimant “ages out” of the 
protective shield of child status. 
The special protections for children in the RSD process 
are increasingly valuable and sought out in a world of 65.3 
million forcibly displaced people, of whom 11 million are 
child refugees and asylum-seekers searching for safety. In 
2015, 88,245 unaccompanied or separate children applied for 
asylum in the EU, including 3,045 in the United Kingdom, 
representing an increase of 56 per cent from the previous 
year.4 Recent European Commission data indicate nearly 
3,500 asylum applications from unaccompanied or separate 
children in January 2016 alone.5 The majority of these chil-
dren hail from Afghanistan, the Syrian Arab Republic, and 
Somalia.6 UNICEF documents the journeys of the thousands 
of children risking their lives weekly to reach the United 
Kingdom.7
 With more than 4,000 unaccompanied or separated 
asylum-seekers under the age of eighteen coming into local 
authority care in the United Kingdom,8 the government is 
being stretched to meet its welfare needs. Notably, these 
numbers do not include the equally high number of de facto 
child refugees who are on UK soil but not registered in the 
RSD process, as well as the more than 10,000 unaccompa-
nied or separated migrant children in the EU who are “now 
missing, and are potentially victims of sexual exploitation, 
trafficking or other criminal activity.”9
Beginning in the decade preceding the European migrant 
crisis, scholars became increasingly interested not only in 
how but also why liberal states afford protections to child 
asylum-seekers over and above those of adults in the UK RSD 
process. Researchers are exploring when and how the idea 
of children as “moral touchstones” in UK society intersects, 
dominates, or subverts citizenship, irregularity, asylum, 
and other statuses in terms of social worlds, legal rights, and 
policy arrangements at a variety of local, regional, national, 
and international levels.10 Children’s rights and protections 
have risen to the top of many political and social agendas 
and have been made symbolically and legally meaningful 
since at least the 1990s with the promulgation of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).11 
Yet research demonstrates how immigration enforcement 
priorities can override these rights and protections, leading 
to “perverse outcomes” that would be otherwise unaccepta-
ble for children.12 
These outcomes also result partially from deeply ingrained 
notions of “race,” class, and other markers converging with 
the administrative nature of the RSD process. Despite the 
fact that women and children are now thought to comprise 
the majority of the forcibly displaced worldwide, the Refu-
gee Convention’s binary understanding interprets and priv-
ileges “adult male” standards above gender-, sexuality-, and 
age-based persecution to the exclusion of most other protec-
tion claims.13 Likewise, the RSD process can be blighted by 
underlying presumptions about the deservingness of some 
groups in contradistinction to the exploitative tendencies 
of others. Researchers describe pervasive assumptions 
about the “bogus refugee” with “socio-economic motiva-
tions” who presents a “problem” of genuineness for the RSD 
process14 and a “threat” to the British people writ large.15 
As will be explained below, unaccompanied or separated 
asylum-seeking children who spontaneously arrive present 
an admixture of deservingness and threat, compounded by 
their independent migrations to the United Kingdom.
Against such a complex background, this article unearths 
and analyzes a new “threat” to the UK RSD system: termed 
here as “imposter-children,” they are asylum-seekers who 
claim to be unaccompanied or separated asylum-seeking 
children specifically to receive preferential treatment in the 
RSD process. I coin the term “imposter-children” cynically. 
My intention is to reflect the state’s antagonism or, at the 
very least, non-data-supported suspicion that some foreign 
nationals are manipulating the RSD process by consciously 
pretending to be something they are not (children). I am 
also using “imposter-children” to unearth the government’s 
conclusion that these actions should be detected and either 
reversed or punished as a matter of safeguarding the RSD-
process (and potentially the British people). 
In addition to sketching and describing “imposter-
children,” I am also arguing that this imagined community 
of adults posing as unaccompanied or separated children 
challenge the RSD process in important ways. The proffered 
“solution” is the process of age-disputing imposter-children 
and then conducting age assessments. Long controversial, 
these assessments continue to play a key role in legitimat-
ing “real” children. By cordoning off unaccompanied or 
separated children and releasing them from the threats of 
detainability and deportability, but also rooting out the 
nefarious adults who seek to undermine this system, my 
argument is that the state is working to make its unjust and 
unfair RSD process appear more defensible in the face of an 
escalating global crisis of displaced children.
Children Negotiating the UK Refugee Status 
Determination Process
As the most commonly invoked and interpreted area of 
international law, refugee status determination (RSD) is a 
manifestation of particularizing global ideas into national-
level bureaucratic decision-making.16 The UK RSD process is 
notable for featuring a formally adversarial structure, onus 
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placement of proving Refugee Convention persecution on 
the asylum-seeker, and no automatic access to legal counsel 
or translation. Judgments vary across regions and venues.17 
Findings of credibility are pivotal for securing Refugee Con-
vention status and the right to stay.18 In this hostile setting, 
young people are “expected to give consistent and coherent 
accounts of their past, whilst often having no independent 
adult to support them and sometimes without a legal repre-
sentative. Many are even forced to repeat the process at the 
age of seventeen and a half, damaging the new lives they 
have managed to build in a foreign country.”19
While awaiting an RSD outcome, children20 are granted 
fuller access to welfare benefits, health care, and educational 
opportunities than adults. The local authority—usually a 
district, city, or county council—provides basic accommo-
dation and educational needs, and assumes increased duties 
towards those aged sixteen years old and younger, than 
those aged eighteen years. While being of minor age does 
not confer automatic rights to refuge and permanent settle-
ment, it is more difficult to remove a child refused asylum-
seeker than an adult, not least because many receiving states 
do not have the facilities to care for them.21
International law, including the UNCRC, and an array of 
national UK legislation are designed to protect children, 
including unaccompanied or separated asylum-seeking 
children. UNCRC Article 3 elucidates the principle that “in all 
actions concerning children … the best interests of the child 
shall be a primary consideration” and requests complemen-
tary protection. Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and 
Immigration Act 2009 acknowledges a duty on the home 
secretary to make arrangements ensuring that immigration 
and asylum functions (among others) are discharged having 
regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of all 
children. This duty is similar to the public duty of care placed 
on other agencies by the Children Acts 1989 and 2004: local 
authorities are required to protect and promote children’s 
welfare, and the courts are expected to take children’s welfare 
as the principal consideration in their decisions.
In 2007, Crawley documented the deleterious effects of 
the RSD process for age-disputed children. She argued that 
a “culture of disbelief” permeates the UK RSD process and 
that the legal, welfare, and mental health consequences 
for children attempting to navigate this system are serious. 
Crawley emphasized that, even when successfully obtained, 
the government-provided welfare and support level to chil-
dren is limited.22 
Crawley also highlighted the fears of unaccompanied 
or separated asylum-seeking children of reaching 17.5 or 18 
years of age. These youth “age out” of the protections from 
detention and removal reserved for children. In the United 
Kingdom, the majority of age-confirmed unaccompanied 
or separated children can be granted Discretionary Leave 
to Remain for three years, or until reaching 17.5 years old, 
whichever is the shorter period. If their applications to 
extend their Discretionary Leaves to Remain fail (as “the 
overwhelming majority” do), they are reclassified as so-
called Appeal Rights Exhausted Care Leavers.23 Without 
a further legal basis to stay in the United Kingdom and 
deemed appeal rights exhausted, such young people will 
become “unlawfully in the UK.”24
Aged-out youth lose their Leaves to Remain simultane-
ous to the unravelling of their access to the relatively rich 
social fabric of accommodation and support provided by 
the local authority. UK immigration law prohibits the local 
authority from providing money, support, or housing to 
unaccompanied or separated youth 17.5 years of age or older. 
Aging-out or aged-out youth have to move out of their foster 
families,25 and many become detainable, removable, and 
at risk of destitution.26 Anxieties about return haunt many 
young people’s stays in the United Kingdom,27 and ques-
tions remain about whether these youth are being protected 
or simply held in limbo for a number of years until their 
claims can be assessed.
Macklin28 persuasively argues that most liberal states 
“deplore” spontaneously arriving asylum-seekers: the 
“spontaneous flow of non-citizens possessing a limited 
legal claim to entry represents a threat to sovereignty-as-
border-control, even though it is an exception to which 
states voluntarily bind themselves by signing the Refugee 
Convention.” Accordingly, liberal states position “deserving 
refugees” as “always already ‘over there’”—with “over there” 
referring increasingly to camps populated by Refugee Con-
vention–certified persons—and “like magic, the refugee is 
disappeared from North America, from Western Europe, 
and from Australia, displaced by the pariah illegal.”29
As an independently migrating agent, the spontaneously 
arriving child asylum-seeker embodies the problematic 
ellipsis of deservingness being equated with “over there” 
but also presents an additional series of moral and practical 
conflicts for liberal states. As evidenced by the consterna-
tion around realizing the Section 55 duty, children trigger 
state-based duties of migration enforcement qua foreign 
nationals making demands on the state, but also of welfare 
safeguarding qua “socially constructed attributes of vul-
nerability, passivity and lack of agency.”30 Their journeys 
are not appreciated as valiant efforts to escape camp-life31 
but rather subversions of the international burden-sharing 
system. In response, the state is being asked to discharge 
its duties as migration “gatekeeper” but also as parens 
patriae, or the chief welfare agent tasked with acting as a 
parent or guardian to all children.32 Language tropes signal 
these Janus-faced roles: “Where a child is ‘looked after’ by 
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the Local Authority the Local Authority acts as the child’s 
‘corporate parent’ … under the Children (Leaving Care) Act 
2000 the Local Authority will also owe a ‘looked after’ child 
longer-term duties as they progress into adulthood.”33 In a 
period of punitive migration controls and restricted wel-
fare spending, this contestation between roles, duties, and 
responsibilities will be heightened. 
This dilemma adheres to advocates for non-citizen 
children as well. They tend to position unaccompanied 
or separated child asylum-seekers as inherently vulner-
able actors who deserve the community’s compassion and 
freedom from detention and removal. Following Zetter,34 
this “bureaucratic identity” not only describes how advo-
cates genuinely feel but also constructs them “in convenient 
images” to achieve certain policy goals. A danger is that a 
small, socially constructed, age-based minority population 
is being cordoned off as deserving of freedom from deten-
tion and deportation, to the exclusion of the rest.35 By cam-
paigning that children deserve special protections in the 
RSD process, they inadvertently legitimize an adjudication 
system that is unfair and unjust to everyone else.36 
Assessments for Age-Disputed Asylum-seekers
As mentioned, “age disputing” names the process for deter-
mining the biological ages of people whose minor statuses 
are disbelieved and who are usually without satisfactory 
identification documents; it is rare for European immigra-
tion officials to dispute the ages of persons claiming to be 
adults but whom they suspect of being children unless in 
cases of human trafficking or involvement in commercial 
sex work.37 Although they invariably produce a range of 
two to three years, age assessments are meant to settle age 
disputes. 
In the United Kingdom, most age disputes occur at the 
screening stage, when UK social workers and immigration 
officials are working to establish the identities of asylum 
claimants as well as their route into the country. The choice 
to dispute age is a discretionary decision undertaken by 
individual officials based on their subjective judgments. In 
the year ending September 2015, 590 asylum applicants in 
the United Kingdom had their ages officially disputed; 574 
underwent age assessments, of whom 65 per cent were diag-
nosed as having a birthdate suggesting they were over eight-
een years old within the one- to two-year age range.38 UK 
process guidance of age instructs immigration officials to 
afford the benefit of the doubt to asylum-seekers whose age 
has not been accepted, “unless their physical appearance/
demeanour very strongly suggests they are significantly over 
18”;39 subsequent inquiries have found that the institutional 
culture of disbelief impedes the benefit of the doubt, how-
ever, and that this situation is “of concern.”40 
European age assessments typically adhere to a psychoso-
cial model whereby social workers cooperate with immigra-
tion officials to conduct “interviews with and observations 
of the young people (with contributions by any other profes-
sionals working with them), exploring their lives (physical, 
emotional, familial, educational and beyond) particularly 
in relation to their social environment, both current and 
past.”41 If the psychosocial exam is inconclusive, technology-
based age assessments may be undertaken. Busler reports 
that “24 out of 30 [European] countries … use carpal (hand/
wrist) X-rays, with approximately half using collar bone 
and/or dental X-rays as part of their age assessment pro-
cess.”42 There are two technologies that may be employed 
in the United Kingdom: (1) bone age and dental maturity 
assessment through X-rays and magnetic resonance imag-
ing and ultrasound; and (2) anthropometric measurements 
without X-rays, including physical size (height and weight 
growth) and sexual development (e.g., pubic hair or breast 
development).
There is no statutory procedure for conducting age 
assessments in the United Kingdom. Justice Sir Stanley 
Burnton provides broad guidance in the 2003 case, R (on 
the application of B) v London Borough of Merton, [2003], 
or Merton, and most practice is based on subsequent case 
law. According to Merton guidelines, the local authority 
has a responsibility to “elicit the general background of the 
applicant, including his family circumstances and history, 
his educational background, and his activities during the 
previous few years” (para. 37). An interpreter may be used to 
minimize misunderstanding. Any doubt about the credibil-
ity of the young person’s information needs to be substanti-
ated and tested (para. 37).43
Merton encourages holistic assessments while being 
wedded to precise definitions of age, vulnerability, and 
maturity predicated on biology. Although it emphasizes 
credibility, Merton legally enshrines the holistic practices of 
“interaction, social history, family circumstances, education, 
self-care, and health” when conducting age assessments.44 
Merton also holds that once a case reaches court, it is neces-
sary to determine the precise age of the claimant, not merely 
that the claimant is currently a child.45 A recent small-scale 
study found that most young people refused asylum on 
credibility grounds had also been subject to age disputes.46 
If the holistic determination under Merton is unsuccessful, 
the Home Office may use invasive technologies to determine 
chronological or biological age, although, as mentioned, a 
precise level of accuracy on age is virtually impossible to 
achieve with these technologies, and significant harms may 
accrue (see “Discussion” section).
Importantly, as mentioned, the likelihood of gain-
ing an accurate age assessment decreases with age,47 thus 
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frustrating the Merton aims of determining a precise age. 
This disconnect is especially important when considering 
that it is the population of borderline aged-out youth who 
are subject to the majority of age disputes and for whom the 
arbitration over one biological year is literally life-changing. 
Triple Discrimination against Male Afghan 
“Imposter-Children”
Documented identity is thus key to access child-only protec-
tions and forgoing age assessments. Birth registrations, for 
example, are thought to establish identities, provide a link 
to a particular state, facilitate access to social security and 
other services, impede risks such as trafficking and illegal 
adoption, and increase the likelihood of family reunifica-
tion.48 Flagging the significance of these documents for RSD 
processes, UNCRC Article 7 imposes a requirement upon all 
signatory states to register children immediately after birth.
For many displaced people, however, such vital docu-
ments are not easy to obtain, keep, or present. Estimates hold, 
for example, that about 51 million children born in 2006 have 
not had their births registered.49 Substandard bureaucratic 
infrastructure during times of instability affect displaced 
people’s abilities to document their biological ages.50 During 
wartime, documents may be destroyed intentionally or acci-
dentally, and children may also flee without bringing along 
their identification documents. Smugglers and traffickers also 
take away documents during journeys. “Imposter-children” 
may be falsely accused of destroying their birth registrations 
or other identity documents when, in truth, they were never 
provided with any. The scholarly and policy debates over 
important questions such as whether a biological age coheres 
with social age, how a person’s maturation ought to be docu-
mented, the ethics of states harnessing mobilities through 
monopolizing documentation, and why migrants without 
identities are interpolated as threats to citizens remain unset-
tled; however, “bureaucratic identity” à la Zetter continues 
to dominate RSD processes, and certain documents form its 
beating heart.
The problem of documenting biological age is particu-
larly acute for Afghans. The Afghan government did not 
have bureaucratic or institutional capacity to register births 
during the protracted wars of the 1980s and 1990s. Since 
identification cards and driving licences were not com-
monly used anyway, and because government paperwork 
requested Islamic calendar dates, families often forewent 
recording their babies’ exact birthdates.51 In 2003, coverage 
of live birth registration was at 6 per cent, making the bur-
den of proof of age determination much more onerous for 
Afghan nationals than for those from European countries.52
Against this background, the United Kingdom is remov-
ing an increasing number of aged-out refused asylum-seekers, 
of whom a target population appears to be spontaneously 
arriving Afghans: Gladwell and Elwynn53 report that 20 
aged-out Afghan nationals were forcibly removed from 
the United Kingdom in 2009, but that this figure increased 
more than three-fold to 70 in 2010, increasing again to 100 
in 2011. In 2016, the minister for immigration admitted that 
over the past nine years, 2,748 aged-out young people had 
been removed to Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, and other countries, 
with the majority (2,018) removed to Afghanistan. 
In August 2015, a judge issued a blanket ban on remov-
als to Afghanistan because the country was too dangerous; 
but in the following March 2016, the Court of Appeal over-
turned the injunction, clearing the way for the Home Office 
to resume chartered flights for aged-out unaccompanied 
minors.54 Common difficulties for aged-out Afghans being 
involuntarily return to Kabul from the United Kingdom 
include reconnecting with family and social networks; the 
psychosocial impact of insecurity and poverty in Afghani-
stan; lack of education and employment opportunities: 
actual and perceived “Westernization” of returnees; and 
risky attempts at re-migration to Europe.55 The removals 
occurred in the midst of deteriorating security conditions 
in Kabul—the site of handover to Afghan authorities—and 
despite warnings about the dangers of repatriations by a 
prominent Afghan minister.56 
Following Macklin, there seems to be cultural disconnect 
between the levels of tolerance and support being extended 
to unaccompanied or separated children resettled from 
camps, versus those who arrive spontaneously to claim asy-
lum through the RSD process. In sum, the former are more 
likely to be labelled victims, while the latter are threats. In 
relation to the particular threat posed by aged-out Afghan 
males, there may also be a gendered and racialized dimen-
sion to the characterization: following Rygiel’s conceptu-
alization of “hegemonic masculinity,”57 these youth are 
simultaneously innocent victims of the wars in Afghanistan 
but also illegal and criminal migrants. Their nationality 
makes both the Afghan children and the Afghan aged-out 
youth seem less deserving of permanent protection through 
indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom.58 In a 
pan-European situation of allegedly scarce resources where 
asylum is meted out only to a fortunate minority, and where 
Refugee Convention–certified children from camps are pri-
oritized above spontaneous arrivals, it is likely that Afghan 
male youths will continue to be age-disputed, and perhaps 
this treatment will normalize them into becoming ultimate 
“imposter-children.”
Discussion
The antipathy towards spontaneously arriving asylum-
seekers claiming to be children animates a February 2016 
34
Volume 32 Refuge Number 3
interview that British Member of Parliament for Monmouth 
David Davies gave to the Daily Mail newspaper. In it, the MP 
spoke of the “complete ruse” of adults posing as children: 
‘These people come over here and get preferential treatment 
by claiming they’re 12 and no one wants to call them out. 
We’ve seen how bad things can get with other incidents in 
Europe … It’s becoming common place.”59 The incident that 
sparked the heated interview was tragic: an Afghan unac-
companied or separated asylum-seeking child allegedly 
attacked his Welsh foster family. A subsequent age assess-
ment of dental maturity indicated that the Afghan had a 
chronological or biological age of at least twenty years old, 
not the age of sixteen years he claimed upon arrival.60 In 
October 2016, the minister of state indicated that a twenty-
eight-day age verification process may be used for resettled 
children from the now-razed Calais migrant settlement—
many of whom are Afghan nationals—but he ruled out 
intrusive dental and X-ray checks for this group.61
My focus in this article has been unearthing and analyz-
ing why MP Davies and others are morally offended when 
adult asylum-seekers pose as children. I shorthand this 
logic to the “imposter-children” phenomenon. Surely part 
of the Welsh tragedy is that the host family was “tricked” 
into hosting an adult. In a climate of accelerated and puni-
tive border, immigration, and asylum enforcement, child-
only protections are increasingly valuable, to the asylum-
seeker but also to the moral sense of deservingness felt by 
the community offering them. Many community members 
feel that it is wrong for foreign nationals over eighteen years 
of age to access these protections, and, further, that such 
unwarranted access is a concerted act of deceit, subterfuge, 
or criminality. These biological adults are “buying time” in 
the United Kingdom that they do not deserve, and should 
be rooted out, exposed, and potentially removed.
Far from extending the benefit of the doubt, and despite 
repeated injunctions from civil society, the government 
seems at times overly eager to identify adults in the RSD 
process whose claims to be children can be “unproven” 
with age assessments. This eagerness comes at real costs. 
While they are denounced when they take too long to 
complete or necessitate too much scrutiny or contact in a 
non-culturally sensitive manner, age assessments should 
also be criticized when conducted too hastily or with too 
much distance. The consequences of either mistake can be 
exposure to enforcement actions supposedly reserved for 
adults. Significantly, spontaneously arriving children are 
consistently co-mingled with adults in UK detention centres 
and prisons,62 despite government promises to the contrary. 
Yet there is also often a feeling of moral outrage when it is 
revealed that children are co-mingled with adults in deten-
tion.63 However, when the state broadcasts that some adult 
foreign nationals are manipulating the RSD process by 
consciously pretending to be something they are not (child 
asylum-seekers), the implication is that aspersion should be 
cast not only on the fraudulent minor status but also on the 
asylum-seeker’s claim to stay.
Indeed, the trend is real enough that a cottage industry of 
private, for-profit social workers has coalesced to offer inde-
pendently contracted and “unbiased” age assessments for a 
price.64 The rubrics and rhetoric of age assessments play a 
key role in discursively legitimating the difference between 
imposters and “real” children. For example, the term Mer-
ton compliant has emerged to describe a local authority 
assessment that has been conducted in accordance with 
case law. By cordoning off children for special treatment, 
but also rooting out the nefarious adults who would oth-
erwise undermine this system, the state is able to make its 
unjust and unfair RSD process appear more defensible.
A final note should be offered on the ethical propriety 
of invasive age assessments in UK society. Though only 
used sporadically, they are still in play and their results are 
respected, such as the dental maturity exam conduced on 
the Afghan fostered in Wales. The normative acceptance that 
immigration officials may resort to these technologies at all 
is worrying. The technologies are invasive and contentious, 
and they may psychologically harm children.65 They have 
an unacceptably high margin of error.66 There is no stand-
ardized approach between or within European states.67 A 
precise level of accuracy is virtually impossible to achieve 
with these technologies,68 and the likelihood of gaining 
an accurate age assessment decreases with age.69 Thus, in 
addition to the harms incurred, the fact that “experts agree 
that age assessment is not a determination of chronological 
age but an educated guess”70 calls into question the baseline 
utility of assessing a population almost always verging on 
minor status by a couple of years.
European governments have been reluctant to acknowl-
edge the damage that age assessments can cause. One 
reason for the reluctance could be that it would provoke 
recognition of a paradox: invasive age assessments require 
informed consent. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
informed consent as “permission granted in full knowledge 
of the possible consequences, typically that which is given 
by a patient to a doctor for treatment with knowledge of the 
possible risks and benefits.” Since informed consent can be 
given only by adults, children submitting to invasive age 
assessments are being forced to do something they cannot 
legally do: in order to prove their minor status and gain 
basic rights such as release from detention, protection from 
removal, and access to welfare support, they must submit 
to a procedure from which children are legally prevented 
to consenting. While migration studies has been attuned to 
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issues of informed consent in research methodologies and 
ethics,71 the problematic presentation of “imposter-children” 
presents a novel opportunity to explore further the role of 
informed consent as it relates and informs not only to the 
researcher–refugee relationship but also to the immigration 
official-refugee dynamic.
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